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Abstract
The US is proposing a prototype of a dual coolant liquid lead–lithium DEMO blanket concept for testing in the
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) as an ITER test blanket module (TBM). Because safety
considerations are an integral part of the design process to ensure that this TBM does not adversely impact the
safety of ITER, a safety assessment has been conducted for this TBM and its ancillary systems as requested by
the ITER project. Four events were selected by the ITER international team (IT) to address speciﬁc reactor safety
concerns, such as vaccum vessel (VV) pressurization, conﬁnement building pressure build-up, TBM decay heat
removal capability, tritium and activation products release from the TBM system and hydrogen and heat production
from chemical reactions. This paper summarizes the results of this safety assessment conducted with the MELCOR
computer code.
1. Introduction
An attractive blanket concept for a fusion reactor that has
been explored by both the US and EU is the dual coolant
liquid Pb–17Li (DCLL) breeder design [1–4]. As shown in
ﬁgure 1(a), reduced activation ferritic steel (RAFS) is used as
the structural material. Helium is used to cool the ﬁrst wall
and blanket structure, and the self-cooled breeder Pb–17Li is
circulated for power conversion and for tritium breeding. A
SiCf /SiC composite insert is used as a magneto-hydrodynamic
(MHD) insulation to reduce the MHD pressure drop of the
circulating Pb–17Li and as a thermal insulator to separate
the high temperature Pb–17Li from the helium cooled RAFS
structure. For the reference tokamak power reactor design,
this blanket concept has the potential of satisfying the design
limits of RAFS while allowing the feasibility of having a
high Pb–17Li outlet temperature of 700 ◦C. As a participant in
the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)
test blanket module (TBM) programme, the US is developing
an ITER TBM based on this blanket concept.
Because safety considerations are an integral part of
the design process to ensure that the DCLL TBM does not
Figure 1. DCLL design schematics for (a) the reference tokamak
reactor blanket and (b) the ITER TBM.
adversely impact the safety of ITER, a safety analysis has
been conducted for this TBM and its ancillary systems. At
the present time, the safety assessments of TBMs address a
number of concerns or issues that are directly caused by TBM
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system failures [5], such as
(1) vacuum vessel (VV) pressurization,
(2) vault pressure build-up,
(3) purge gas system pressurization,
(4) temperature evolution of the TBM,
(5) decay heat removal capability,
(6) tritium and activation products release from the TBM
system and
(7) hydrogen and heat production from chemical reactions.
The following sections of this paper present a general
description of the DCLL TBM and its associated ancillary
equipment, safety-related source terms of the DCLL TBM
system components, an assessment of the TBM system during
a selected accident event sequence and a summary of our
ﬁndings.
2. TBM description
As shown in ﬁgure 1(b), the DCLL TBM described in [6]
is approximately a box that is 64.5 cm in width, 194 cm in
height and 30.5 cm in depth. This TBM will occupy one
half of an ITER TBM test port. The 0.4 cm thick ferritic
steel ﬁrst wall (FW) of this TBM is clad with a 0.2 cm thick
beryllium layer. Fast ﬂowing helium in toroidal channels
behind the FWprovides cooling to both the ﬁrst and the second
walls of the TBM. Two Pb–17Li breeding zones are radially
situated behind the secondwall. SiC-composite inserts in these
breeding zones provide thermal insulation for the TBM walls
from the poloidally ﬂowing Pb–17Li. In addition, these inserts
serve as an electrical insulator to reduce the MHD forces on
the ﬂowing Pb–17Li. A 5 cm thick back-plate forms the outer
radial edge of the TBM.
The TBM FW and structure are cooled by 8MPa helium.
This helium enters the module at 340 ◦C and exits the module
at 420 ◦C. This helium is delivered to the TBM by pipes at the
back of the TBM. Once outside of the ITER VV, these pipes
run approximately 80–90m to a heat exchanger located in the
ITER tokamak cooling water system (TCWS) vault. Here, the
helium rejects the TBMFW/structure heating to water through
an aluminium tube heat exchanger.
The inlet and outlet temperatures of the Pb–17Li in the
self-cooled breeder zones of the TBM can be controlled at
temperatures between 340 ◦C and 450 ◦C, and 440 ◦C and
700 ◦C, respectively. The operating pressure for this system
is 0.4MPa. The pipes that supply the Pb–17Li to the TBM
are concentric pipes that run from the TBM into the TBM test
cell, where they enter the shell side of a helium-cooled heat
exchanger.
A second cooling system supplies helium to the tube
side of the Pb–17Li heat exchanger and rejects heat to a
water-cooled aluminium tube heat exchanger that also resides
in the TCWS vault. The 8MPa helium inlet and outlet
temperatures for the Pb–17Li heat exchanger is 200 ◦C and
360 ◦C, respectively.
3. Source terms
Source terms of this TBM generally fall into three categories:
radioactivity (tritium, breeder and structuralmaterial activation
products), heat (nuclear or chemical) and pressure (non-
condensable gases such as hydrogen and helium).
Radioactive source terms. Tritium will be bred in both the
Pb–17Li and the beryllium FW cladding of the TBM. The
tritium production rate for the liquid breeder is estimated to
be 1.59 × 10−6 gm s−1. Based on the tritium permeation
calculations for the DCLL TBM and its supporting ancillary
systems, the structural material of the entire TBM system
will contain 235mg of tritium, the FW beryllium layer will
contain 33mg and the breeding material will contain ∼2mg
[6]. When these tritium sources are combined, the total tritium
inventory is 270mg, which is small in comparison with the
tritium inventory produced within the ITERVV during normal
operation of 450 g [7]. Of the 2.33 gm of tritium bred annually
in the Pb–17Li, 7.5% of this is lost to the ITER conﬁnement
building. This permeation rate is presently about twice what
the ITER International Team (IT) would like to have, so more
design options are being considered.
Previous safety studies show that the radioactive isotopes
of Pb–17Li that are a safety concern arePo-210 andHg-203 [8].
Neutronics calculations have been performed for the DCLL
TBM with the ONEDANT module of the DANTSYS 3.0
discrete ordinates particle transport code system [9]. After
30 000 full power ITER pulses without cleanup, the entire
Pb–17Li inventory is predicted to contain only 1.8 Ci of
Po-210, and 36 Ci of Hg-203. If these two inventories were to
be released to the environment by way of a stack, the doses for
Po-210 and Hg-203 at a 1 km site boundary during average
weather conditions would be 0.08mSv, and 0.002mSv,
respectively [10]. These conservative dose estimates are much
less than ITER’s site boundary dose limit (50mSv) [11].
The ﬁve isotopes that dominate the F82H radioactivity
at shutdown are Fe-55, Mn-56, W-187, Cr-51 and Mn-54,
respectively [9]. However, F82H radioactive isotopes are in
a solid form that is difﬁcult to mobilize. One mechanism that
can mobilize them during accidents is surface oxidation of the
F82H structural material by steam. Reference [12] estimated
the rate of F82H steel oxidation based on data taken for the
ferritic steelHT-9 [13]. Assuming that the resulting radioactive
oxides were to be directly released to the environment by way
of a stack during average weather conditions, the estimated
site boundary dose rate is ∼6 × 10−3 mSv d−1 for the TBM at
700 ◦C. The top dose contributors are: Ta-183 (69%), W-187
(14%), Co-60 (7%) andMn-54 (3%). As was demonstrated by
[12], TBMFW temperatures during accident conditions do not
remain above 700 ◦C for more than several hundred seconds.
Given this information, it appears there should be little safety
concern regarding this source of radioactivity during accident
conditions.
Chemical energy source terms. Chemical energy and
hydrogen are released when Pb–17Li comes in contact with
water. This could occur in the ITER VV during accidents that
cause a simultaneous spill of the TBM Pb–17Li and ITER
FW/shield cooling water. At the present time, ITER has
speciﬁed a TBM Pb–17Li inventory limit of 0.28m3 based
on the assumption that 100% of the lithium in this volume will
react to produce the ITER hydrogen limit for this reaction of
2.5 kg. A larger Pb–17Li volume would be allowed if it can be
demonstrated by calculations or data that not all of the lithium
will react. However, experiments have not yet been conducted
that are prototypical of the contact mode anticipated for TBM
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accidents in ITER, which is an atomized spray of Pb–17Li into
a pool of water. The test of [14] comes close, where Jeppson
examined the pouring Pb–17Li into excess water. For that
test, 20 g of liquid metal at 600 ◦C was poured into 4000 g of
water at 95 ◦C, resulting in∼50%of the lithium in the Pb–17Li
pour sample reacting to form hydrogen. However, since the
total breeder volume for the TBM plus ancillary equipment is
presently estimated to be ∼0.4m3, more reaction tests may be
needed to resolve this issue for this TBM.
A second chemical energy and hydrogen generation
source is the reaction between the TBM FW beryllium
cladding and steam. The quantity of beryllium on the TBM
FW clad is 4.6 kg, which is less than the 10 kg beryllium
limit set by ITER. While the mass of hydrogen that can be
generated by the TBM FW beryllium is not a signiﬁcant
ITER safety concern, the chemical heat generated (330MJ)
is a safety concern regarding the thermal integrity of the
TBM FW. As a consequence, models developed to analyse
TBM accidents included the beryllium–steam reaction rate
information speciﬁed for ITER [7].
Nuclear energy sources. The nuclear source terms that the
TBM must handle during normal operation and accident
conditions are plasma surface heating, nuclear heating, decay
heating and plasma disruptions. During the ﬂat top portion
of a full power D-T 500MW ITER pulse, the average TBM
FW heat ﬂux will be 0.3MWm−2, with a peak heating of
0.5MWm−2 over 10% of the FW area. The TBM FW neutron
wall loading will be 0.78MWm−2. For the TBM nuclear
energymultiplication of 1.006, the resulting total TBM thermal
heat load is approximately 1.38MW [9]. The decay heat for
the DCLL TBM is low because of the material choices for this
TBM and the moderate neutron ﬂux and ﬂuence level that this
TBMwill experience during ITERoperation. At shutdown, the
total decay heat is ∼22 kW with the largest contributor (68%)
being the Pb–17Li. The decay heat levels after 1 hour, 1 day
and 1 year are 3.5 kW, 1.0 kW and 0.1 kW, respectively. The
reference ITER disruption will deposit 1.8MJm−2 of energy
on the TBMFWandmust be accounted for in accident analysis
for the TBM.
Pressure source terms. The ITER IT has speciﬁed a limit
on the quantity of non-condensable gases that a TBM can
contain based on fouling of the ITER vacuum vessel pressure
suppression system (VVPSS) by such gases during large break
in-vessel loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs). The present
limit for helium is 45 kg. The DCLL TBM has two ancillary
systems that contain helium: the FW/structure and Pb–17Li
secondary helium cooling systems. Both systems contain less
than 20 kg of heliumeach. Given the fact that the upper limit on
hydrogen generation for the DCLL TBM is ∼5 kg, this TBM
should not present a pressure source term problem for ITER.
4. Accident analyses
As an initial examination of the safety impact that TBMs will
have on ITER, the ITER IT asked the participating parties to
analyse the following four accident scenarios: (1) in-vessel
TBM coolant leaks, (2) in-TBM breeder box coolant leaks,
(3) ex-vessel TBM ancillary coolant leaks and (4) complete
loss of active TBM cooling. In addition to these base case
scenarios, the ITER IT also requested several parametric cases
per accident scenario to determine the inﬂuence that modelling
assumptions have on the results for the base case. In this paper
we will only summarize the results of one of these scenarios,
but a complete discussion can be found in [12]. The following
paragraphs of this sub-section describe the results obtained
for the ex-vessel TBM ancillary helium coolant leak accident
scenario.
Method of analysis. A modiﬁed version of the MELCOR
1.8.5 code [15, 16] was used to analyse the ex-vessel TBM
helium coolant leaks accident scenario. The input model
developed forMELCOR includes the TBM, the TBMancillary
equipment and ITER relevant enclosures. In total, the model
consists of 30 control volumes, 37 ﬂow paths, 72 heat
structures, 6 valves, 1 rupture disc, 1 pump and 2 circulators.
The TBMwas modelled by two Pb–17Li control volumes
(representing the breeding zones), seven helium control
volumes (representing the coolant for the FW, second wall
(SW), ribs/divider plate, and top, bottom, side and back-
plates), and 54 one-dimensional heat structures representing
the F82H structure of the TBM. Pseudo three-dimensional heat
conduction is achieved among these heat structures through
MELCOR user deﬁned control functions.
The pipes, heat exchangers (HX), temperature control
valves and pumps or circulators were modelled for all the three
cooling systemsof theTBM,which are (1) thePb–17Li breeder
cooling loop, (2) FW helium cooling loop and (3) Pb–17Li
secondary helium cooling loop. A pressure relief valve is also
attached to the top of the Pb–17Li drain tank that vents into
the TBM test cell at a tank pressure greater than 4MPa. The
water side surface temperature of the He-water HX was set
at a temperature of 35 ◦C to simulate the ITER heat removal
system.
The free-volume of the test cell, TCWS vault and VV are
also simulated in this model, but not the thermal inertia of the
walls of these enclosures. The relief valve from the test cell to
the TWCS vault wasmodelled to open at a pressure differential
of 20 kPa and to reseat once the differential drops to 1 kPa.
The VV free-volume was modelled as a time-speciﬁed control
volumewith the transient conditions set to those determined by
running a MELCOR model developed for the ITER multiple
FW cooling channel break accident [17]. Iteration between
this model and the TBMmodel resulted in the desired VVPSS
response to the TBM accident.
ITER pulsed operating conditions for this model were
established by running this MELCOR model from an initial
‘hot standby’ condition of 460 ◦C through consecutive ITER
500MW D–T pulses. The TBM model was operated with
temperature control valves set to give FW helium and Pb–Li
inlet and outlet temperatures of 340 ◦C and 450 ◦C, and of
460 ◦C and 650 ◦C, respectively. It was found that the pulse
equilibrium conditions for the model are obtained within two
consecutive pulses starting from ‘hot standby’ conditions.
Identiﬁcation of causes and accident description. For this
accident, a double-ended pipe break of the TBM FW helium
cooling loop is postulated to occur, discharging helium into
the TBM test cell during plasma burn. Since no active
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Figure 2. (a) Test cell, TCWS vault and VV pressures and
(b) expanded view following break during an ex-vessel DCLL TBM
coolant leak accident.
plasma shutdown is to occur, ITER will continue to operate
at full power, and because TBM FW cooling has been lost,
the temperature of this wall will rise until the beryllium
clad melts, releasing beryllium vapour into the ITER plasma.
At a temperature of 1278 ◦C [18], the TBM FW beryllium
evaporation rate will cause the ITER plasma to disrupt. The
intense plasma disruption that ensues will deposit 1.8MJ of
plasma stored thermal energy onto the TBM FW and generate
runaway electrons that when lost from the plasma are assumed
to cause multiple TBM and ITER FW cooling tube failures
within a 10 cm high toroidal strip. Consequently, a blow-down
of ITER FW cooling water occurs, injecting water and steam
into the ITERVV. This pressurization causes the ITERVVPSS
to open and forces steam into the TBM through the failed TBM
FW.After the coolant inventory is lost, the TBMwill be cooled
by radiation to the VV. The accident is assumed to begin 100 s
prior to the end of the ﬂat top of a 500MW pulse, or 400 s into
the pulse, to guarantee peak TBM temperatures at the time of
the accident. In addition to this accident sequence, a hypothetic
variant case was also considered during which it is assumed
that the induced plasma disruption further damages the TBM
box such that the Pb–17Li content of the TBM spills into the
steam ﬁlled ITER VV.
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Figure 3. Test cell and TCWS vault (a) helium masses and (b) steam
masses during an ex-vessel DCLL TBM coolant leak accident.
Transient analysis results. Figures 2–4 contain some results
for this accident scenario. Figure 2 presents the pressures
predicted for the test cell, TCWS vault and the VV. Because
the break is assumed to occur within the test cell, the test cell
pressure is seen to rapidly rise following the TBM FW helium
cooling system pipe break. The pressure vent line for the test
cell opens after∼400ms, but the test cell pressure continues to
rise reaching 0.15MPa at 1 s. The test cell pressure decreases
beyond this time, as the TCWS vault pressure increases from
the helium venting into it from the test cell. At 45 s, the test
cell to vault pressure differential has decreased to 1 kPa and the
test cell vent valve reseats. At ∼90 s after the ex-vessel pipe
break, the TBMFWheats to a temperaturewhere the beryllium
clad melts. The evaporation of this beryllium melt induces a
plasma disruption that ruptures ITER FW cooling channels,
venting FW cooling water into the VV. As the VV pressurizes,
steamﬂows through the failedTBMFWheliumcooling system
and into the test cell, causing the test cell pressure to rise a
second time. The test cell vent line reopens at 106 s, venting
steam into the TCWS vault. By this time, the VVPSS has
activated and the VV pressure decays after reaching a peak
pressure of 0.163MPa. Within 300 s of the initial pipe break,
the VV and test cell become sub-atmospheric as the VVPSS
continues to condense the steam in the VV. The test cell vent
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Figure 4. (a) FW and second wall (SW) temperatures and (b) FW
hydrogen production during an ex-vessel DCLL TBM coolant leak
accident.
link closes, leaving the vault pressure 3.4 kPa above its starting
value.
Figure 3 contains the predicted helium and steam masses
in the test cell and TCWS vault during this accident. The
masses of helium in the test cell and TCWS vault 4400 s after
the TBMFWcooling system pipe break are 1.5 kg and 10.7 kg,
respectively, of the ∼13 kg total lost from this system. The
mass of helium that enters the VV is 0.75 kg, which is below
the quantity of helium that would threaten the safety function
of the VVPSS.
Figure 4 presents FWtemperature andberylliumoxidation
for this accident. The TBM FW beryllium reaches a
temperature of 1278 ◦C within 90 s of the loss of FW cooling
caused by the TBMheliumpipe break. At this temperature, the
beryllium evaporation rate disrupts the plasma. Past this time,
the temperature continues to increase due to the beryllium–
steam reaction, but once the steam pressure in the VV starts to
decrease this reaction slows and the FW temperature begins to
decay. By 4400 s, the FW temperature drops to 340 ◦C. The
predicted quantity of hydrogen generated by the beryllium–
steam reaction is 0.15 kg, which is well below the ITER limit
of 2.5 kg for this reaction.
Figure 5 contains results for the variant case of this
accident. Figure 5(a) gives the volume of the Pb–17Li
predicted to enter the VV and the volume that remains in
the TBM system during this event. In ∼100 s, 0.32m3 or
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Figure 5. (a) Pb–17Li volume and (b) VV pressure comparison
during a variant ex-vessel DCLL TBM coolant leak accident with a
simultaneous in-vessel blanket break.
∼2920 kg of Pb–17Li leaks into the VV. The quantity of
hydrogen generated by the ensuing Pb–17Li-water reaction is
∼1460 g based on the data of [14]. The Pb–17Li that remains
in the TBM system resides primarily in the Pb–17Li ancillary
system, and should only come into contact with steam.
Because the Pb–17Li-steam reaction is relatively benign, and
only 25 g of steam enters the Pb–17Li ancillary system during
the time frame analysed, the quantity of hydrogen generated
should be less than the ITER allowed limit for Pb–17Li-
water reactions of 2.5 kg. The primary reason that steam is
prevented from entering the TBM system is the expansion of
the helium cover gas from the accumulator of the Pb–17Li
ancillary system. Since the pressure of this gas is higher than
the steam pressure in the VV, the net ﬂow of gas is primarily
from theTBMinto the ITERVV.The impact onVVpressure of
this hydrogen, the latent heat liberated from the Pb–17Li, and
the 0.75 kg of helium that enters theVV is shown in ﬁgure 5(b).
The maximum VV pressure is predicted to be only 15 kPa
higher than the base case scenario.
5. Summary and future directions
A preliminary assessment of the safety impact on ITER of a
DCLL TBM concept shows that the anticipated radiological
inventories are small in comparison with those produced in
the ITER VV due to normal operation of ITER. Possible
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hydrogen sources were examined in this assessment and the
conclusion was drawn that the maximum quantities produced
during accident conditions should be less than the ITER limit of
2.5 kg per chemical reaction. Pressurization of the ITER VV,
TBM test cell and TCWS vault by the helium coolant from the
TBM ancillary system does not pose a serious threat to these
conﬁnement structures.
As the ITER TBM Programme moves forward, the ITER
IT seeks licensing approval for TBMoperation at the same time
that ITER obtains licensing approval. This means that in the
near future, the safety assessments of the TBMswill have to be
brought into line with the safety assessment already performed
for ITER-FEAT. To accomplish this, the ITER IT is asking
the TBM participating parties to perform failure modes and
effects analyses (FMEAs) on their TBM systems to determine
likely accidents that bound the consequence of accidentswithin
four event categories: operational, anticipated, design basis
and beyond design basis. Based on this FMEA, accidents
will be selected per category for the TBM parties to analyse.
Some of these accidents may be those already analysed in
the preliminary safety analysis described in this paper. The
TBM analysis work is to be completed by January 2007, in
order to include the results in ITER’s Report on Preliminary
Safety (RPrS). This RPrS is the document required to obtain a
construction permit for ITER.
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